Ms. Gardner, I appreciate your efforts to reserarch and cite certain portions of the trial transcript to prove me "WRONG." However, I believe your efforts do more to support my comments than yours.  My rebuttal is more or less in the order you addressed the subject and all italicized words are my emphasis added.

1.  Contained in the 7110.65 you cited are procedures controllers should employ to keep pilots safe from the wake turbulence of other aircraft; it includes the basic "Wake Turbulence Cautionary Advisories," the 3-minute separation guidelines and the exception to the 3-minute rule "Wake Turbulence Separation For Intersection Departures." In that context, you ask: what is it about "caution wake turbulence for the preceding Dash 8 departure" that Stewart doesn't get?  Here are some things he didn't get:

• * The departure point, the departure time, or the position of the Dash 8.

• * The correct wind information: you provided misleading wind information to Col. Stewart. A direct crosswind is very different form a headwind/crosswind.  Just check out the recorded winds from the LLWAS from the sensor nearest to Stewart's runway; it shows the wind is 60 degrees different from what you gave him. The correct winds are essential to estimating the persistence of wake turbulence on the runway.

• * The full measure of information required when applying the exception to the 3-minute rule, which as you cited, reads: "c. When applying the provision of sub para b
  • - Issue a wake turbulence advisory before clearing the aircraft for takeoff.
  • - Do not clear the intersection departure for immediate takeoff.
  • - Issue a clearance to permit the trailing aircraft to deviate from course to avoid the flight path of the preceding large departure when applying b1 or b2. (i.e. the exception).
  • - Separation requirements in accordance with para 3-9-6, Same Runway Separation, must also apply.

You adamantly state..."I applied this provision exactly as the FAA intended." Really!? It seems clear to me that you did not give Stewart the full measure of additional information in your warning or, most importantly, the time or distance separation from the Dash 8, you simply assumed he had seen the Dash 8.

To finish this discussion of the wake turbulence warning, you cite of 7110.65 re Wake Turbulence Cautionary Advisories "b. Issue information to any aircraft if in your opinion, wake turbulence may have an adverse effect on it." Apparently you believed that Stewart could be adversely affected by the Dash 8 wake, because you issued the warning, but as he testified, he had every reason to believe that you had already provided either the required separation of 3 minutes or that he was positioned so his departure would be less than 500 ft. separation from the Dash 8 departure point, which it was not.

2.  You say it was ridiculous for me to note parenthetically that you "...spent years researching and studying intersection takeoffs." Well. I don't think my statement was so ridiculous given your testimony that you researched the subject ten years ago, applied the criteria over a ten-year period and that since the accident, you had researched, carefully examined and written an extensive report about this specific intersection-related accident.

3.  The MTO weight of the type Dash 8 apparently ranges between 36,300-64,500 lbs. I don't know the weight of that specific aircraft on that day, but I'll accept your assertion that its MTO weight of the DHC8-200 was 36,300 lbs. The testimony of McElroy was that the Sport-Jet would typically test fly "...in the 3,000 lb. range." If it was actually, say 3,300 lbs., the weight differential between the specific Dash 8 and the followng Sport-Jet would have been 11 as I stated. Anyway, my point was not so much to identify an exact to-the-pound figure, but rather to emphasize that there was a huge weight and size differential, which you know or should know, to be proportionally related to the potential danger of wake turbulence.

4.  I had seen three separate emails from ATP pilots concerning Dash 8 as a wake turbulence generator and I mis-remembered one as concerning a B737. My bad! In actuality, one pilot flew the 19-seat Jetstream 32 for Atlanta Coast Airlines and the other also flew Jetstreams, which he said averaged about 14,000-16,000 lbs. landing weight.

One of the pilots wrote "Wake turbulence was a big issue with the Dash 8." "The Dash 8 and MD 80 were the most concerned aircraft to follow. They both climb with a high degree. Their wing loading must be so great just after takeoff because these aircraft were the hardest to recover from. The roll rate would exceed the recover rate of using coordinated flight." The other Jetstream pilot encountered the wake of a preceding Dash 8, on approach; he wrote: "After this, (a first bump) the airplane dramatically rolled right approximately 90 degrees." In the recovery process, he very quickly went from 1,000 ft. to 500 ft. and had to go around.

Finally, a third ATP pilot's email read: "In 30+ years I have had a number of encounters with wake turbulence...by far, the Dash 8 produced the most violent wake. Maybe now, through your efforts, this phenomenon will receive the attention it deserves."

Three points from the above:

The Jetstreams had only a 2x weight differential compared to the DHC8-200.

Stewart most certainly had no chance to recover from his upset.

I would excpect a controller with your experience to be knowledgeable about the serious wake potential from Dash 8s operating out of your airport.

5.  This brings me to the final and most important point; by your own reply, it is clear that Stewart was entitled to, but did not get, the less-than-500 ft. separation required for the 3-minute exception rule to apply. Again, I repeat your statement that, "I applied the rule exactly as the FAA intended"...I don't think so!

Look at your cited references 7110-9-6 (Same Runway Separation) and 7110.65 3-9-7 (Wake Turbulence Separation For Intersection Departures). It is clear to me that the FAA intention is to separate the two aircraft from each other (because of possible wake turbulence), NOT separate just one aircraft from some point on the  ground!

You also commented that: "Mr. Stewart could have entered the runway from A1 and taxied 2,000 feet south on the runway before he began his takeoff roll, and it would have had no bearing on the directive." What am I missing?  Wouldn't that be true only if the 3 minutes had expired prior to his beginning his takeoff roll?  The required separation is to be either 3 minutes or less than 500 ft. between the departure-point of the two aircraft, is it not?

Further, you wrote "There was no interpretation of the provisions in the 7110.65. I am permitted to use suitable landmarks to determine distance along a runway." Then why didn't you do so for both aircraft? You testified that you determined the Dash 8 was 150 ft. from the threshold by using the 150 ft. white lines on the runway as a reference point; so why didn't you use the equivalent centerline white lines to go further up the runway (just before the highly visible runway 35 hold-short line 835 ft. from the threshold) to determine not just where Stewart actually began his departure but from which every aircraft that enters A1 begins their departure?

Had you done that, you could have easily seen that Stewart would be 200 ft. or more past the intersection you had determined was 450 ft. from the Dash 8 departure point and thus, at least 150 ft. beyond the less than 500 ft. that allows you to apply the exception. You either saw Stewart's departure or you did not. Either way, you made a costly error; the exception from the 3-minute rule was not applicable, so you should have held Stewart to "...ensure the small aircraft does not start takeoff roll until at least 3 minutes!

At the very least, you could have warned him (or advised him) that he had neither of the two standards you know are required for safe separation. Instead, you assumed that he had seen the Dash 8 departure and believed maintaining separation then became Stewart's responsibility, not yours. But your assumption was incorrect; Stewart had not seen the Dash 8 and so he had no reason to think he would be cleared for takeoff by you without the required separation.

You knew perfectly well he wasn't going to back-taxi to the threshold because a pilot must ask permission to do that and it makes no sense on an over 10,000 ft. runway. Your own supervisor testified that the Dash 8 pilot wouldn't have considered that given the available runway length, so why would Stewart back-taxi? You also apparently assumed that Stewart would not follow the lead-in line, which pilots are trained to do and which of course is why it's painted on the runway.

The fact is that, if your interpretation (measuring the departure point of the first aircraft to the intersection, not to the departure point of following aircraft) were corrrect, you would  never find it necessary to hold or warn even a Piper Cub! A wake-turbulence warning is less than an adequate substitute for ensuring the pilot is fully aware that he has neither the 3-minute separation nor the less than 500 ft. separation exception.

Throughout your posts you have sprinkled several disparaging comments about pilots in general and Col. Stewart in particular. You note pilot responsibilities and options without looking at your own. The pilot can only be responsible for what he can see and know, and controllers must also act on what they see and know - that's why you're in a tower and why the pilot has to check in with you. In this case, you relied on assumptions, estimates and an incomplete wake warning when, had you given the appropriate separation bewteen departures and/or other situational information, the accident could have been avoided.

Ms. Gardner, I want you to know that I take no pleasure from these criticisms. I fully understand why you would want to protect your reputation, but the reputations of Mr. Bornhofen and Col. Stewart were destroyed in part through your testimony, and a great aviation project, produced at a cost of millions of dollars and years of uncompensated effort, was derailed by your unwillingness to admit the possibility of a mistake. Worst of all, lives were almost lost that day and if you really believe you did everything perfectly, then the next wake accident may not be long in coming and the occupants may not be as fortunate as those protected by Sport-Jet's uniquely robust cabin.

 

 

I have been following the dialogue about the Sport-Jet trial and I have decided to join the discussion, because I am convinced this accident and the case that followed will have ramifications for general aviation safety far beyond the specifics of this trial.

 

By way of disclosure, I am retired USAF and have remained current in aviation matters. I have followed the Sport-Jet program for several years, watched the aircraft being built, attended numerous test flights and have gotten to know the two test pilots well. So I’m not a novice with respect to aviation principles or the Sport-Jet aircraft.

 

For the above reasons, I attended every day of the Excel-Jet v. the U.S. Government (FAA) trial and took copious notes. What follows are my observations and personal opinions of the primary issues, testimony and trial outcome consequences.

 

At trial, the Department of Justice (DOJ) attorneys quickly realized that they could not blame the Sport-Jet design or construction for the accident, so the issue narrowed to what caused the accident. Excel-Jet charged that it was wake turbulence still present on the runway because the FAA controller failed to provide the required separation from a preceding takeoff of a large (Dash 8) commercial aircraft. The government insisted the accident was caused by Pilot Error… the test pilot stalled the Sport-Jet after takeoff!

 

First, the controller/separation issue: Ms. Gardner was the controller for the Sport-Jet takeoff and was the most important witness for the government regarding the actions of the tower. I was stunned by her testimony in which it seemed to me, she tried to shed any responsibility to provide the Sport-Jet pilot, Col. Stewart, with meaningful information beyond the takeoff clearance and what has become a standard Colorado Springs airport “wake turbulence” warning.

 

Because of the dangers inherent with invisible wake turbulence, FAA regulations call for a three-minute separation between a small, light, aircraft following an FAA category “Large” aircraft on takeoff when the small aircraft takes off from an intersection. What is critical for safety is the weight-ratio differential between aircraft; the larger the ratio, the more severe the wake is for the small aircraft. In this case, there was a very big weight differential…the Dash 8 was 11 times the weight of the Sport-Jet and is also known as a strong wake producer because of its high wing loading. For example, it is known to have upset a trailing Boeing 727 commercial jet!

 

When Ms. Gardner cleared Stewart for takeoff, she failed to let him know that he was not getting the standard separation. Her testimony was that the 3-minute separation was not required by procedures because Stewart was entering the runway from an intersection ahead of where the Dash-8 had entered the same runway and, if the distance is 500 feet or less, (which was her estimate) the following aircraft is deemed to have taken off from essentially the same spot and is presumed to be safe from the wake of the larger aircraft.

True enough, but here’s the problem; the intersection point of the A1 intersection is identified as being 600 feet from the runway threshold, which would require that the Sport-Jet be held for 3 minutes. However, Ms. Gardner dismisses that fact, saying that she estimated that the Dash 8 was 150 feet ahead of the threshold so it was actually only 450 feet from the intersection and Sport-Jet when it began its takeoff roll. But, Ms. Gardner (who claimed to have spent years researching and studying intersection takeoffs) had to know that Stewart, like any other pilot, would follow the intersection’s curved, yellow lead-in line to the center of the runway and that would place him 230 feet further down the runway from the intersection point.  Therefore, the actual departure separation was thus 680 ft., well beyond the 500 ft. or less required for her to be able to waive the 3‑minute rule!

 

In addition to misapplying the 3-minute separation exception to this flight, Ms Gardner attempted to shift what I believe were clearly her responsibilities onto to the pilot, Col. Stewart:

 

·         Stewart should have seen the Dash 8.  Stewart was not on tower frequency as he taxied out; he was on ground control concentrating on the taxi and other normal pilot actions; once on the taxiway towards the intersection, the Dash 8 was behind him.

 

·         Stewart could have held after he was cleared.  Why would he do that?  Gardner has given him no reason to believe he wasn’t separated by at least the required three minutes from the Dash 8. Once cleared, pilots are supposed to get going, not clog up the system.

 

·         Stewart could have requested permission to back taxi. Again, why would he do that? Stewart believes he had been given adequate separation and he has 10,000 ft. of runway for an airplane that would be off the ground in less than 1,500 ft.

 

Ms. Gardner had been a controller at the Colorado Springs airport for 8 or more years and claimed she was very knowledgeable about the dangers of wake turbulence. She also testified that she had studied and written a report specifically concerning the issue of separation requirements related to intersection takeoffs.  Perhaps that’s all true, but on this clear, sunny morning she nevertheless guided Col. Stewart into a hazardous situation based on erroneous assumptions she made about what Stewart saw, heard or would do.

 

She also didn’t advise him that she was clearing him under an exception to the 3-minute rule; didn’t give him any idea about the departure interval; didn’t suggest a hold for separation from the Dash 8 and didn’t offer climb or heading options to avoid possible wake turbulence.  These options are specifically mentioned in the section of her primary operating procedures manual dealing with the 3-minute rule and exceptions thereto.

 

On this clear day, the only predictable potential hazard was wake turbulence; if the controller isn’t  going to focus on that, pilots would be better off without a tower…at least then they would know they were on their own.

 

All of the above would be largely irrelevant if the accident was not caused by wake turbulence, which brings us to the government’s other key expert witness. Robert “Hoot” Gibson. Gibson’s background included: fighter pilot, aeronautical engineering degree, astronaut, some airplane construction and, experience as a “reliable” government expert.

 

Gibson obviously knows why and how airplanes fly, so the testimony he gave can only be described as a total fabrication…to avoid using the L word.  In short, he testified that:

 

·         the Sport-Jet, by his calculations, had an LOD ratio only slightly better than the space shuttle and a drag value about the equivalent of a Boeing 737;

 

·         Stewart (despite his thousands of hours in AF fighters) pulled the Sport-Jet into the air prematurely;

 

·         the plane flew briefly in ground effect then stalled as it left the beneficial lift of ground effect at about 10 ft. and,

 

·         because Sport-Jet stalled, it rolled left and crashed…ergo, Gibson glibly concluded,  Pilot Error, not wake turbulence caused the accident!

 

Hoot would have been laughed out of any aeronautical engineering classroom for presenting such nonsense: the Sport-Jet’s LOD during takeoff was about 20 and that was clearly evident on a test-flight video; a plane will simply not come off the runway until it has sufficient lift and once up, it continues to accelerate (in this case at about 6 knots a second), it can’t stall unless the pilot yanks back on the stick and finally, ground effect has no noticeable effect on any aircraft during normal takeoff.

 

Further, a pilot eye-witness testified that Sport-Jet lifted off normally and was flying almost straight and level for about 3-4 seconds. However, in the end, the Flight-video evidence, pilot logs, an eye-witness and Stewart’s adamant statements about the upset (he told the judge he’d never unintentionally stalled an airplane in his life) meant nothing -- the judge accepted Hoot’s story.

 

This was not Gibson’s first appearance in a case filed against the FAA and, as he had done twice before, he certainly earned what at least in this case, was his 6-figure compensation. But at what cost?  He slandered the only viable, Personal Light Jet project in the U.S., ruined a fellow fighter pilot’s reputation and in the process, permanently sullied his own.

 

Predicted Ramifications.

 

·         By her posts, Ms. Gardner obviously feels vindicated by the Court’s decision; presumably, she will continue to “eyeball” separation distances for intersection takeoffs using standards that remain unknown to the pilots she is controlling. More importantly, the court’s decision has now established a precedent that allow controllers to be careless about giving pilots the intended protection of the intersection 500 ft. rule.

 

·         The FAA/DOJ has now won several lawsuits filed against controllers using high-profile, richly-compensated witnesses who will apparently, happily testify as required.  Further, in this case the Denver judge who had handled all the motions and responses for over a year-and-a-half, was suddenly replaced just before trial by a judge from Kansas…coincidence perhaps, but the government has certainly benefitted by adding another consideration to any party contemplating a future lawsuit.

 

·         The FAA will continue to increase airport throughput and reduce separation standards in conjunction with its NexGen program.

 

·         General Aviation pilots will operate in a more dangerous environment and predictably, more accidents will occur. When they do, the government will be ready with a team of attorneys, the right federal judge and a plethora of professional, expert witnesses to prove “Pilot Error” once again.