Mr. Uhl, your arguments would be intriguing if only you knew what you were talking about.  I’m into aviation education, but I can’t convince the adamantly, willfully un-convinceable.  I’ll try once again, but if you just want to insist that you’re right and I’m wrong, I guess I can’t stop you.

Sir, believe me, I did not write an extensive report about this specific accident.  I have not written an extensive report about wake turbulence or procedures related thereto.  I am not that big of a nerd.  I never testified to having done anything of the sort.  You misunderstood, period.  I will, however, concede that I am more knowledgeable of and more particular about the application of wake turbulence procedures than the majority of controllers with whom I have worked over the years.  So please don’t try to interpret the rules for me or anyone else, because you aren’t equipped to do so.

You seem to imply that I gave the wrong wind information to Mr. Stewart.  I gave him the Airport wind, which is what I am required to give, if I give wind information at all - which I am not required to do with every clearance, but which I do at least once if not more for every pilot I clear to land or take off because I believe it is useful information.  I wouldn’t argue with you that wind information is important to determining the potential effect and location of wake turbulence; that’s why I supply the information I have with every clearance. 

The fact that there is a sensor which may have been closer to his position on the runway cannot enter into this discussion because there is no readout for any one particular sensor in the tower.  COS ATCT uses an LLWAS-RS (Low Level Windshear Alert System – Relocation/Sustainment), which provides an Airport wind readout and ARENA (AREa Noted for Attention) readouts which pertain to the arrival and departure areas of each runway.  All these readouts are computer generated combinations – algorithms, perchance – of the data from the ten remote sensors on the airport.  All the indications in the tower were that the winds were light and out of the east.  The sensor data to which you refer was parsed out for the purposes of the trial; it was not available in the control tower, and there was no way to have provided it to anyone.

Again, I did NOT “simply assume” that Mr. Stewart had seen the Dash 8 – that’s why I said “caution wake turbulence for the preceding Dash 8 departure.”  I said I had every reason to believe that he had seen it, but I did not assume that he had.  Mr. Stewart report in “Solo Flight in the Sport-Jet” that “I was able to really appreciate the expanse of glass which provides an exceptional view from wingtip to wingtip.”  Hard to imagine that he could miss that larger aircraft moving in front of and abeam his position on the adjacent runway, but that’s why I gave him the information.  I would stipulate that any “assuming” was done in the cockpit, not the tower.  YOU assume that he would have done something differently if he had seen it; I guess we’ll never know. 

And again, you are trying to mix actual weight and MTOW.  Can’t do it and be believable.  Besides, it makes no difference from an ATC procedural point of view.  We have aircraft weight categories and procedures because we can’t know the actual weight of every aircraft out there.  I’m sorry if some 19-seat turboprop pilots of your acquaintance had some issues with wake turbulence from Dash 8s.  You probably can’t fly much without encountering an aircraft that is larger and more wake-producing than yours at some point – that’s why they invented wake-avoidance procedures.

You don’t think I applied the rule as the FAA intended because YOU DON’T UNDERSTAND THE RULE.  Read 7110.65 para. 3-9-7 again, carefully this time:  it says that if the DEPARTURE POINT of the large aircraft is 500 feet or less from the INTERSECTION, the 3” does not apply.  It does not refer to the departure points of BOTH aircraft.  That is no mistake – if that’s what it meant, that’s exactly what it would say.  It says “intersection” rather than “departure point” because there is no way to anticipate exactly what the pilot at the intersection will do - he always has the option to adjust his plan, if he feels it to be prudent, by back-taxiing, waiting, or some other alternate course of action.  Conversely, if a pilot decides to follow the lead-in lines or taxi down the runway for 2,000’ and then start his takeoff roll, that is entirely his choice and has no bearing on how the ATC procedure is applied.  Where Stewart actually began his departure roll was his decision.

You call this my “interpretation,” but that is EXACTLY what the rule says.  For me to do otherwise would be an interpretation.  You say I “estimated,” but I used an exact measurement of a fixed, standard runway marking.  You say I “assumed,” when, in fact, I assumed nothing.  OK, I get it, so you don’t like the rule – fine, but don’t blame the controllers – tell the FAA.  You say “a wake-turbulence warning is less than an adequate substitute” for what you erroneously consider to be proper application of the procedures, but the pilot always has the last word on whether he goes or he doesn’t.

Nor is the directive concerned with lead-in lines, which are painted on runways to provide directional guidance, especially in low-visibility conditions.  There is no requirement to follow them.  Some pilots may be taught to follow them, but I’m sure a pilot of Mr. Stewart’s experience would know that he is not required to do so.  Many pilots do not follow them, but square their taxi and turn to line up with the centerline.  Some back-taxi a bit, some back-taxi a lot, some back-taxi to the threshold – and please, tell me where it says a pilot has to ASK to do that, because I’ve been looking for that rule for 20 years and have never found it.  Sometimes they ask, sometimes they tell, sometimes they just do it.  The entire runway belongs to the pilot unless otherwise restricted. 

Why would it “make no sense” to back-taxi on an 11,021-foot runway if wake turbulence is a concern to the pilot and back-taxiing would provide more separation in time and flight path between the two aircraft?  Sure, I “knew perfectly well” he wouldn’t back-taxi, that’s why I made him wait until I could allow him to do it instead of just clearing him for takeoff – that makes a lot of sense, doesn’t it?

I will reiterate that, despite Excel-Jet’s protestations to the contrary, this has not been proven to be a wake-turbulence-induced accident.  Someone in here alleged that the Government somehow prevented the truth from coming out in court but, as I understand it, the Plaintiff had the opportunity, the responsibility and the high-priced attorneys to make their case and – call me naïve – I don’t see how the Defendant might prevent that. 

I’m not sure how you COULD derive pleasure from your uninformed and inadequate appraisal of my performance, nor am I worried about my reputation, as if any of you could harm me.  Anyone who doesn’t want me as their air traffic controller can suit himself and taxi back to the hangar.  My employer approves of my operation and knowledge base.  Please, call the tower manager if you think I'm dangerous:  719-380-6700.  I would encourage anyone to call any FAA facility if they are concerned about anything they've experienced in the NAS.

I want the folks to understand the realities of this situation for the same reason I would hope that you do – to enhance aviation safety. 

And, if you want to buy a Sport Jet, I think you should go ahead and do so.

Jeanne C. Gardner

ATCS, COS ATCT

Fantastic, Jeff Mattoon, you should stop addressing me, because you have no clue what you are talking about.  Nor can you spell my name right.

My supervisor did not call my actions into question.  In fact, he testified:  “She used the threshold markers, which I did not know the distance of and have not used, but everything was within compliance with national orders, local orders, and what I would consider good practice.”

In your original post, you called me “the ‘offending’ controller.”  You accused me of having an “attitude” that contributed to the Sport Jet accident.  You insinuated that I was “potentially the most dangerous” amongst air traffic controllers.   You don’t know me, you don’t know anything about me; you are not in a position to evaluate my professionalism.   You don’t understand the ATC procedures and, thus far, have not been able to discuss them intelligently.

Between you and your Excel-Jet bedmates, I think I have been the subject of more personal attacks here than perpetrator.  Nor did I make any personal attacks about air traffic controllers, and don’t you dare put words in my mouth.  I’ve been working in the system for over 25 years and I know what I’ve seen.  I’m sure it would surprise you, if you think I’m one of the dangerous ones.

I desire no credibility with you.  You are a neophyte, and I am not your teacher.

Now, fluff your pillow, pull up the covers and drift off to Wannabe World.

Seeeee Ya!!!

Jeanne C. Gardner

ATCS, COS ATCT

Mr. Uhl, I would hope that the Sport Jet case – no matter what caused the accident - will have ramifications for GA safety:  that pilots would learn how the system works, and that they would take responsibility for the safe operation of their aircraft.  I’ll leave it to others to argue aerodynamics and aeronautical engineering, since that is not where my expertise lies.  Suffice to say that the testimony of the Government’s witnesses was ultimately more compelling than that of the Excel-Jet witnesses.

OK, you and your Excel-Jet buddies clearly have a “Resurrect the Sport Jet/the Government is Always Wrong” agenda.  Let’s try this:  since no one in his right mind would (as Mr. Stewart urged) “curl up with a copy of the trial transcript,” I shall present the pertinent portions of testimony and FAA documents to show that you and your confederates are, in a word, WRONG. 

You say that in my testimony I tried to “shed any responsibility to provide the Sport Jet pilot with meaningful information about the Dash 8 beyond the takeoff clearance and what has become a standard Colorado Springs Airport wake turbulence warning.” 

First, I testified that I followed the procedures as required by the FAA.  I had no need or desire to “shed responsibility” for the accident. 

JEANNE GARDNER:  “…I was not concerned about my standing with the FAA or any other government agency because I have never had any doubt in my mind that I was doing my job correctly on the day of the accident.”

Secondly, what is it about “caution wake turbulence for the preceding Dash 8 departure” that is not meaningful or which a pilot of Mr. Stewart’s aptitude could fail to comprehend?  If he had any concerns about that aircraft, this was the time to speak up.  If, by “meaningful information,” you are alluding to the paragraph in the 7110.65 which requires position information be issued about the preceding aircraft, here it is:

7110.65  2-1-20. WAKE TURBULENCE CAUTIONARY ADVISORIES

a. Issue wake turbulence cautionary advisories and the position, altitude if known, and direction of flight of the heavy jet or B757 to:

REFERENCE AC 90-23, Aircraft Wake Turbulence, Pilot Responsibility, Para 12.

1.      TERMINAL. VFR aircraft not being radar vectored but are behind heavy jets or B757s.

 “Heavy jet or B757” - got that?  This also refers to aircraft in flight, not on the ground waiting to depart.

 And, I really hate to do this, but you guys started it.  Here is Mr. Stewart’s explanation – after 4 years to think about it - of why he did not process the warning he was given: 

ATTORNEY PESTAL:  “Now, you do not dispute that you were given a "caution, wake turbulence" by the control tower prior to your takeoff on June 22, 2006.”

JAMES STEWART:  “I don't dispute that it was given.  I didn't hear it.”

PESTAL:  “And is there a reason that you didn't hear it?”

STEWART:  “It has to do with probably the human mind.  In other words, when you are sitting there, you are receiving the things that you are listening for.  Sometimes you hear things that you want to hear.  Sometimes you hear things that you need to hear.  Sometimes you don't hear the things that are perceived as not relevant.  There are a lot of transmissions that take place on the radio, and so remembering every call sign or remembering every piece of that transmission, unless it's specifically directed at me, may or may not happen.”

PESTAL:  “I just kind of want to find out a little bit more, when you say you didn't hear it, how that compares with the transmission to clearance for cleared for takeoff that you received from the tower.  You do recall hearing that, responding to it, and taking action in response to it, true?

STEWART:  “That's absolutely true.

PESTAL:  “Now, so with the "caution, wake turbulence," did you hear and just choose not to respond to it, or just went in one ear and out the other?”

STEWART:  “That's kind of difficult -- well, it's what we're talking about is a human problem here, a human issue. Humans receive and dispense information and based upon a variety of factors.  So there can be a transmission on a radio.  There are lots of transmissions on the radio directed at a variety of different people.  And some of those -- the ones that are directed at you or you are specifically listening for, they involve your call sign, and you try, your mind tries to absorb them.  There are specific things you are listening for.  There are specific things that you may not be listening for.  So we're talking about human factors here.”

Third:  This is not a standard COS Airport warning – it is a requirement everywhere:

FAA 7110.65  2-1-20. WAKE TURBULENCE CAUTIONARY ADVISORIES

b. Issue cautionary information to any aircraft if in your opinion, wake turbulence may have an adverse effect on it.

NOTE:  Wake turbulence may be encountered by aircraft in flight as well as when operating on the airport movement area.

Because wake turbulence is unpredictable, the controller is not responsible for anticipating its existence or effect.

PHRASEOLOGY:  CAUTION WAKE TURBULENCE (traffic information).

Mr. Stewart said in his blog that “I have flown out of the Colorado Springs airport hundreds of times and heard many ‘cautions’ for wake turbulence.  Those cautions have been issued after the appropriate hold times have expired and resulted in no excessive concern.”  That is absolutely not possible.  That may be his perception, but we have already seen that his perception has been, at least sometimes, flawed.  It also contradicts his testimony:

TRIAL TRANSCRIPT, Day 5, Page 1110, Line 8 through Pae 1111, Line 10

PESTAL:  But all I want to know is when the "caution, wake turbulence," when it went through your headset, you know, did it hit anything in between your headset, so to speak?             

STEWART:  “Well, let's put it this way: ’Caution, wake turbulence’ is a routine announcement from the tower which has very little significance in most pilots' minds because they hear it so often, and there's nothing associated with it.  ‘Caution, wake turbulence’ is issued ofttimes, and the pilots have no clue as to why it's issued and anything like that.  So there's a lot of information that a pilot receives in his head; there's information that he's looking for, and there's information that he doesn't care about.  The information he's looking for is usually preceded with his call sign.  The information he's looking for, he's already determined what that is.  The information you're looking for is the ‘cleared for takeoff.’  That's clearly the thing that the mind will not miss.  There may be other extraneous information, the winds or the fact that there's other things going on that you may or may not receive based upon your mind's priority and importance associated with it.  I think that answers the question.“

PESTAL:  “Thank you, sir.”

STEWART:  “Uh-huh.”

PESTAL:  “So is it fair to say that you did not process ‘caution, wake turbulence’?”

STEWART:  “I think it's obvious that I didn't process ‘caution, wake turbulence.’”

You say I “claimed to have spent years researching and studying intersection takeoffs” and that I wrote “a report specifically concerning the issue of separation requirements related to intersection takeoffs.”  Really?  That’s ridiculous.  I guess you hear what you want to hear.

ATTORNEY LAMPERT: I want to know what your criteria was.

GARDNER: My criterion that day was that the aircraft was south of the threshold markers and therefore I had less than 500 feet between his departure point and the intersection.

LAMPERT:  So that was your criteria. Was that every day or just that day?

GARDNER: That's been my criterion for a long time.

LAMPERT: Ten years.

GARDNER: At least.

LAMPERT:  “‘Cause you told me ten years is when you first had this problem arise.”

GARDNER:  “I said I had known that at least that long ago.”

LAMPERT:  “But at ten years ago, you went out and researched this.” 

GARDNER:  “ This, I researched it or I found the information and it occurred to me that it would be useful in this situation.” 

Now, your contention is that the Dash 8 was 11 times the weight of the Sport Jet.  I believe you have an apples/oranges problem here.  From www.Mesa-air.com, Mesa Air Group, the operator of the Dash 8 in question, dated 7/22/06, the Maximum Take Off Weight of the DHC8-200 is 36,300 lbs.  From www.sport-jet.com (a now-defunct website of Excel-Jet, Ltd.) on 9/21/06, the “MTOW Weight” (sic) of the Sport-Jet is listed as 4,900 lbs.   11 x 4,900 = 53,900.  Are you using the MTOW of a different model of Dash 8, which would not be particularly helpful?  Are you relying on the testimony of Sport Jet test pilot Ron McElroy?

ATTORNEY SCHADEN:  Now, in general terms, approximately what is the gross weight of this airplane? What's the maximum allowable this airplane weighs?

RONALD MCELROY:  Well, the maximum allowable by design was 4,900 pounds.  When we were flying it, typically in the 3,000-pound range, and maybe a little bit more than that, on all of our flights.

SCHADEN:  Between 3,000, 3500 pounds?

MCELROY:   Yes, roughly. Yes.

SCHADEN:  And do you have any familiarity with the aircraft known as a DASH 8?

MCELROY:  Yes, I do.

SCHADEN:  Have you ever flown the DeHavilland aircraft?

MCELROY:  I have flown the DeHavilland.

SCHADEN:  What is the approximate weight of the DeHavilland aircraft?

MCELROY:  Well, depending on the model, they can go as high as, I think it's 64,000 pounds, maximum, gross weight.

SCHADEN:  And was that DeHavilland DASH 8, what would its maximum allowable gross weight be?

MCELROY:  The DASH 8 would be 64,500, as I understand the model.

SCHADEN:  In terms of piloting and controlling aircraft, how would you refer to the size, the relative size of these two airplanes?

MCELROY:  Well, I think the relative size was the DASH 8 was probably, without getting too mathematical about it, at least four to six times larger than the Sport-Jet, just in terms of pure dimensions. Weight-wise, it was even bigger in terms of weight.

SCHADEN:  Ten times?

MCELROY:  Like ten times. Maybe more.

On www.bombardier.com, the MTOW of what is now called the Q400 (DHC8-400) is listed as 64,500.  Mr. McElroy's testimony was either mistaken or just plain – shall we say - disingenuous.  There are several models of Dash 8, and the aircraft that preceded the Sport Jet’s departure was a DHC8-200, not a DHC8-400.  Not only that, but let’s resist the temptation to mix MTOW and actual weight.  (And remember, die-hard Sport Jet fans, the accident aircraft is not alleged to have flown up a vortex tube, but to have encountered a 2-minute-old “remnant” of a vortex.)

Which brings us to the Dash 8 which you say was “known to have upset a trailing Boeing 727 commercial jet!”  In the spirit of truth-telling, Mr. Uhl, would you elucidate on this alleged incident?  I’d be interested in knowing the particulars, including the model DHC8.  (Please do tell; I’m working on my next report…)

Here are the portions of the 7110.65 which are germane to the separation discussion:

Separate a departing aircraft from a preceding departing or arriving aircraft using the same runway by ensuring that it does not begin takeoff roll until:

a. The other aircraft has departed and crossed the runway end or turned to avert any conflict. (See FIG 3-9-1.)  If you can determine distances by reference to suitable landmarks, the other aircraft needs only be airborne if the following minimum distance exists between aircraft: (See FIG 3-9-2.)

4. When either is a Category III aircraft - 6,000 feet.

7110.65  3-9-7. WAKE TURBULENCE SEPARATION FOR INTERSECTION DEPARTURES

a. Apply the following wake turbulence criteria for intersection departures:

1. Separate a small aircraft taking off from an intersection on the same runway (same or opposite direction takeoff) behind a preceding departing large aircraft by ensuring that the small aircraft does not start takeoff roll until at least 3 minutes after the large aircraft has taken off.

4. Inform an aircraft when it is necessary to hold in order to provide the required 3-minute interval.

PHRASEOLOGY: HOLD FOR WAKE TURBULENCE

b. The 3-minute interval is not required when:

2. USA [US ARMY] NOT APPLICABLE. The intersection is 500 feet or less from the departure point of the preceding aircraft and both aircraft are taking off in the same direction.

c. When applying the provision of subpara b:

1. Issue a wake turbulence advisory before clearing the aircraft for takeoff.

2. Do not clear the intersection departure for an immediate takeoff.

3. Issue a clearance to permit the trailing aircraft to deviate from course enough to avoid the flight path of the preceding large departure when applying subpara b1 or b2.

4. Separation requirements in accordance with para 3-9-6, Same Runway Separation, must also apply.

The Dash 8 entered Runway 17R from Runway 12.  Despite Excel-Jet’s wishful thinking, it did not back-taxi, therefore a 3” hold was not required.  I did not “estimate” the position of the Dash 8 – I observed its position reference clearly visible and standard runway markings.  I visually observed the Dash 8 stopped in position on the runway, south of the 150-foot-long threshhold markers, when the pilot asked me to verify his takeoff clearance.  Where I come from, 600-150 = 450, which is less than 500 any day of the week.  There was no “interpretation” of the provisions in the 7110.65.  I am permitted to use suitable landmarks to determine distances along a runway.  Paragraph 3-9-6.a, above, is one of several references to this use.

Mr. Stewart got the same separation that would have been required had both aircraft taken off from the threshold, or from A1 intersection, or from any other same point along the runway, because that’s what the procedures stipulate.  That separation requirement (if one or both aircraft be a Cat III) is 6000 feet and airborne, with a wake turbulence cautionary advisory.  He got significantly more than that.

Despite the ignorance some persons have of this long-standing provision, and despite the desperate need of some to blame me for the accident, I applied this provision exactly as the FAA intended.  There is no requirement to advise a pilot that a clearance is being issued according to an exception to the 3-minute rule, because it is considered that both aircraft are taking off from the same point.  If they had both stopped on the same dime on the runway and then started their takeoff roll, the only requirement would be a “caution wake turbulence” – oops, I must be boring those of you who hear that too often!

The FAA has never issued crystal balls, so there was no way to predict how Mr. Stewart would access the runway and start his takeoff roll.  I’ve spent years watching “every other pilot” and, believe me, there is a lot of variation.  “Lead-in lines” are not regulatory, they are advisory in nature, just like taxiway and runway centerline markings.  For that matter, there are identical yellow lines turning to the north from A1 and leading to the centerline - in the direction, in fact, of the threshold of Runway 17R.  When a pilot receives a takeoff clearance, unless restricted otherwise, he is entitled to the entire runway.  Mr. Stewart did not request an A1 departure, nor did anyone restrict him to departing from the intersection:  it was his decision.  His position at A1 was only an artifact of it being the closest point one can get to the threshold of Runway 17R from Taxiway A without entering the runway. 

Mr. Stewart could have entered the runway from A1 and taxied 2,000 feet south on the runway before he began his takeoff roll, and it would have had no bearing on the directives.  When Mr. Stewart called ready, I could have cleared him for takeoff with no delay from A1 intersection and I would still have been in compliance with the rules.  Instead, I held the Sport Jet until traffic landing Runway 12 was not a factor in case Mr. Stewart wanted to back-taxi to the threshold.

I had every reason to believe that Mr. Stewart had seen and heard the Dash 8 depart right next to his position on the taxiway but, in case he hadn’t, I advised him “caution wake turbulence for the previous Dash 8 departure.”  I gave him no reason to believe that he had been separated from anyone by 3 minutes or any other interval.  (If I had been applying a wake turbulence hold, the requirement was to say “hold for wake turbulence.”  Then, when he got a takeoff clearance, the pilot would be justified in thinking that any pertinent interval had expired.)

Trial Transcript, Day 5, Page 1123, Line 6 through Page 1125, Line 3

ATTORNEY PESTAL:  Let me ask you this, Mr. Stewart. If you had seen the DASH 8 take off ahead of you on June 22, would you have done anything differently?

STEWART:   Absolutely.

PESTAL:  What would you have done differently?

STEWART:  Well, first of all, you would have known where the airplane took off. You would have -- you have been able to make decisions based upon where the airplane took off concerning rotation. You would have been able to time the airplane. In other words, if I saw the airplane, I would think twice about how far behind that airplane I really want to be. So there are a lot of decisions that could have been made just by having eyeballs on the target.

PESTAL:  If you had actually heard and processed "caution, wake turbulence" on June 22, would you have done anything differently?

STEWART:  Remember the clear criteria here is that when you're given a clearance for takeoff, the pilot has to assume, and I did assume, that the airport was safe to take off. With that assumption, then I will accept a clearance for takeoff unless there are some extenuating circumstances. I knew of no extenuating circumstances, so I therefore accepted the clearance.

PESTAL:  Is it your testimony, sir, that you expected the control tower to take care of you without any effort on your part?

STEWART:   The control tower's responsibility is to provide me with a safe environment for takeoff, period.

PESTAL:  Did you have any responsibilities for wake-turbulence avoidance under the Airmen's Information Manual?

STEWART:   You always have responsibilities. However, in this case, we're talking about clearance for takeoff.

PESTAL:  Well, actually, we weren't. I thought we were talking about "caution, wake turbulence."

STEWART:   We're talking about clearance that was issued to me to take off at an airport and whether the airport was safe to take off.

PESTAL:  Okay.

STEWART:   That's my only concern.

PESTAL:  Let me -- maybe I didn't ask the question very well.

STEWART:   Okay.

PESTAL:  Did you have any responsibilities, yourself, for wake-turbulence avoidance under the AIM?

STEWART:   Under the AIM, after the clearance for takeoff, I've got responsibilities. In other words, they can issue a "caution, wake turbulence" after I got that clearance for takeoff, then I have responsibilities.

PESTAL:  Did you perform any of the responsibilities the AIM says you should?

STEWART:   I didn't have the opportunity to.

But then Stewart testified:

Trial Transcript, Day 5, Page 1138, Line 21 through Page 1139, Line 3

ATTORNEY COPPOLA:  Did . . . if the "caution, wake turbulence" had hit something in between your headset, your left ear and your right ear, would you have done anything different this day?

STEWART:  No, absolutely not. And that's an important point, that there was not -- I have reviewed this obviously in my head, and there was nothing that I would have done differently, absolutely nothing.

OK, so if he had seen the Dash 8 take off in front of him, he would “absolutely” have done things differently, but if he had heard the “caution, wake turbulence for the preceding Dash 8 departure,” he would “absolutely not” have done anything differently, “absolutely nothing.”  Huh?  And about that “I did assume, that the airport was safe to take off” thing - when Mr. Stewart takes the runway at a controlled field, does he scan the final before turning his back to it?  If not, why not?  And, if so, why would he?  Hmmmmmm……

You say: “Once cleared, pilots are supposed to get going, not clog up the system.”  FAR 91.3 states that “The pilot in command of an aircraft is directly responsible for, and is the final authority as to, the operation of that aircraft.”  Naturally, the Sport Jet pilot would operate his aircraft in a safe manner and obtain an alternate clearance if he was unable or unwilling to accept the one he received – right?

I’m sorry that Mr. Stewart believed then that he had been given adequate separation and now believes that he was not, but that doesn’t change the facts that he was given more than the required separation and – for whatever reason - was not concerned enough about his situation to ask for anything different. 

He had numerous options available to him if he felt threatened by wake turbulence, but he requested none.  Controllers are not required to anticipate the location or effect of vortices (see 7110.65 2-1-20 above).  Pilots are required to visualize and avoid them, hence they are in the best position to determine what would be the safest course of action for their flight.  (AIM, Advisory Circular)  The 7110.65 says that, when applying 3-9-7.b, “Issue a clearance to permit…” – it’s not required before takeoff, and it’s not a decision the controller is required to make.  It doesn’t say “to avoid,” it says “to permit.”  Pilots request, and we permit.  That’s how it works.

Yes, GA aircraft will probably be operating in a more dangerous environment in the future, as airspace becomes more congested, pilots rely more on labor-saving devices instead of actually learning to fly and navigate an airplane, phraseology becomes sloppier, pilot and controller knowledge and discipline atrophy, and as long as there’s always someone else to blame for your failures or things that just go wrong. 

Whether this accident was caused by wake turbulence or something else no one wants to acknowledge, only God knows.  What I know is that the appropriate directives were applied correctly.  I’m not concerned about what you or anyone else thinks of me, because I hold myself to a higher standard.  If I ever thought I had contributed to an aircraft accident, I would fully admit it and try to prevent others from doing something similar.  I’m not perfect; I’ve made plenty of errors in my long and interesting career, and have come to be very thankful that God protects mad dogs, Englishmen, and pilots in equal measure.  I’ll also be one of the first in line to say that the FAA is not perfect.  But on June 22, 2006, in this case, any errors which may have been made were not on our side of the microphone. 

I will laud you, however, for not straying into libel and character assassination as did your buddy, Mr. Stewart.  It’s good he decided to sit this round out, because I was just about to suggest he find himself a good lawyer.

Jeanne C. Gardner

ATCS, COS ATCT

test

TEST

Test

I'm not going to fight you in a blog, Mr. Stewart.  The facts are, Excel-Jet lost in court because they failed to make their case; you don't know what you're talking about on the subject of ATC wake turbulence procedures; and you know very well that there is no restricted visibility from the tower to that area of the airport, because the Excel-Jet attorneys have photographs from the tower which prove it.  I'll just leave it there, short of calling you a liar.  It's over now, give it up.

Jeanne Gardner, ATCS, COS ATCT